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Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.: Crashworthiness
in North Carolina
In Martin v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc. 1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit returned to the problem of predicting whether
North Carolina would accept the products liability doctrine of crashworthi-
ness. No reported North Carolina case addresses this issue, and given the ab-
sence of any significant production of motor vehicles in the state, the chance of
its being so addressed in the near future is remote.2 Faced with this vacuum in
the state law, the court of appeals followed its own enigmatic precedent, Wil-
son v. Ford Motor Co. ,3 and held that North Carolina would not adopt the
theory. Martin is significant primarily because it provided a forum to discuss
the basis for rejecting the crashworthiness doctrine in Wilson.
Crashworthiness, a relatively recent products liability theory, first gained
prominence in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp. 4 A court applying the crashworthiness doc-
trine imposes liability on a manufacturer for injuries incurred in motor vehicle
accidents to the extent the injuries are enhanced by defects that, though unre-
lated to the cause of the accident, are caused by the "second collision '" 5 of the
occupants with the interior of the passenger compartment. This enhancement
consists of any injuries in excess of those that "probably would have occurred
as a result of the impact . . . absent the defective design."6
Because crashworthiness is a negligence theory,7 the defect must result
from some negligence of the manufacturer in the design or construction of the
vehicle.8 The manufacturer is negligent when it violates the duty to "use rea-
sonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision."9 This duty of reason-
able care in design also includes a duty to "inspect and to test for designs that
1. 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983).
2. Id at 828 n.1. See infra note 63.
3. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981). In Wilson the court of appeals concluded that the district
court's refusal to recognize the crashworthiness doctrine was not reversible error. The court stated
that the district court had made a careful review of the "related State cases and the several and
divergent federal court determinations on the issue." Id
4. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). General Motors was held liable for negligence in the design
of the Corvair steering assembly which, although not the cause of the accident, resulted in the
transmission of the force of a head-on collision through the displacement of the steering shaft
towards the driver's head. Other designs then in use would not have allowed such displacement.
5. Id at 502.
6. Id at 503.
7. A crashworthiness action could be brought under strict liability or warranty as well as
negligence. Its essential elements-a defect not the proximate cause of the accident and enhance-
ment of crash injuries as a result of the defect-are generally compatible with these theories. A
warranty action would require privity of contract and an express or implied warranty that the
defect was not present. Recent automobile manufacturer advertising in North Carolina could
supply the warranty element. See infra note 108. A strict liability action would require that the
defect be unreasonably dangerous.
8. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503.
9. Id at 502.
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would cause an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury,"10 and a duty to warn
of the failure to perform such tests and inspections or the presence of a known,
dangerous design feature.'1 There is no requirement, however, that the manu-
facturer "design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats
on water."' 1
2
Only two years before Larsen the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit rejected the proposition that Indiana law would recognize the
validity of the crashworthiness theory in Evans v. GeneralMotors Corp. 13 The
Evans court held that while an automobile manufacturer had a "duty to de-
sign its product to be ,reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made,
without hiding defects which would make it dangerous for persons so using
it, '' 14 the intended purpose did not "include [the car's] participation in colli-
sions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possi-
bility that such collisions may occur." 15  Thus, Evans stands for the
proposition that an automobile manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused
by a defect that did not contribute to the cause of the initial collision. 16
The Larsen definition of the duty of automobile manufacturers generally
has prevailed over the definition in Evans.17 In fact, in 1977 Evans was over-
ruled by the Seventh Circuit.' 8 The Evans rationale, however, is still followed
by those federal courts that reject crashworthiness.
Although no North Carolina court has addressed the issue of
crashworthiness, there is a series of cases in which the federal courts in North
Carolina have attempted to predict whether North Carolina courts would
adopt the doctrine. The first was Bulliner v. General Motors Corp. ,19 decided
in 1971, in which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina determined that North Carolina would not adopt the doctrine
because North Carolina law required a "causal relationship between the al-
leged negligence and the accident."' 20 The court's consideration of
crashworthiness was inappropriate and unnecessary, however, because the al-
10. Id at 505.
11. Id
12. Id at 502.
13. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). Evans was brought in an Indiana federal district court.
Decedent was killed in a collision when the left side of the car collapsed on him because of the
design of the car's frame. Plaintiff alleged that use of the design was negligent because a frame
design with side rails that would have better protected the decedent was available. Because Indi-
ana law had not addressed the crashworthiness issue the court was forced to anticipate the re-
sponse of the Indiana Supreme Court. Id at 826 (Kiley, J., dissenting).
14. Id at 824.
15. Id at 825.
16. Id
17. See Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475, 478-79 (E.D.N.C. 1980). See also Huff
v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1977).
18. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (brought in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana).
19. 54 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
20. Id at 482. The front wheel of plaintiff's van fell off and caused the vehicle to swerve into
a ditch. The wheel failure allegedly was caused by negligent design of the wheel retention
mechanism.
[Vol. 621424
leged negligence would have been the proximate cause of the accident, not of
any enhancement of injuries.2 1 Thus, the Bulliner holding on crashworthiness
is dictum. 22
After Bulliner the United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina decided Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line AR. ,23 which in-
volved the collision of a car with a locomotive. The court reviewed the consid-
erable precedent in accord with Evans24 and what little was in accord with
Larsen.25 The Alexander court read Larsen as requiring a manufacturer to
design a vehicle to be absolutely safe in any conceivable collision, including
one with a speeding locomotive.2 6 Since North Carolina had not addressed
crashworthiness, the district court looked to general North Carolina products
liability law. It found that while a manufacturer has a duty to anticipate the
probable results of normal uses of its product, there was no similar duty re-
garding the results of abnormal, reasonably unforeseeable, or criminal uses.
27
The court considered the "'patently careless and improvident conduct' "28 of
plaintiff to be clearly abnormal and reasonably unforeseeable. Fearing that
acceptance of Larsen would loosen the requirement of causation, and let in a
flood of absurd claims, the court expressly rejected the crashworthiness doc-
trine.29 The court of appeals affirmed, but held it "unnecessary to discern and
apply a nonexistent North Carolina rule of law" 30 because damage from im-
pact with the train was so great that the alleged defect could not have been a
proximate cause of any additional injury.
In Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc. ,31 decided in 1977, a floor-mounted
21. Id The court already had ruled that there was insufficient evidence of design negligence.
Id Thus the court's prediction was unnecessary.
22. Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
23. 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971), a'd, No. 71-1915, slip op. (4th Cir., Apr. 25, 1972).
The facts inAexander were rather unsympathetic. Plaintiff drove his Volkswagen into the side of
a locomotive as it sped through a railroad crossing. The car traveled a considerable distance
under the wheels of the train, crushing the gas tank located in the front of the car. This resulted in
a fire which completely destroyed the car and injured plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that negligent
design caused the gas cap to fly off on impact, resulting in the fire.
24. Id at 324-26.
25. Id at 323-24.
26. Id at 327. The Alexander court disregarded Larsen's reasonableness limitation as to
risks that must be eliminated, Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503, and asked: "Must [the manufacturer]
foresee and design a vehicle to withstand a collision with a 114-ton locomotive engine pulling a
freight train traveling at 45 miles per hour?" Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327. There was little
chance of plaintiff winning regardless of the theory used.
27. Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327 (citing Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 492,
157 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1967)).
28. Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327 (quoting Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 242, 96 S.E.2d
14, 18 (1957)).
29. Id
30. Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., No. 71-1915, slip op. (4th Cir., April 25, 1972).
31. 437 F. Supp. 445 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aft'd, 588 F.2d 1351 (1981). Plaintiffwas a passenger
seated in the middle of the car's bench-type front seat. The car originally had a gearshift mounted
on the steering column, but a previous owner had replaced it with a floor-mounted gearshift made
by defendant. The auto was involved in a head-on collision and plaintiff was thrown forward and
impaled on the gearshift. Plaintiff alleged that defendant gearshift manufacturer was negligent in
failing to warn purchasers and users that the unit was dangerous when installed in an automobile
with a bench-type front seat.
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gearshift was deemed a patent danger.3 2 Therefore, its manufacturer was not
negligent in failing to warn of the danger of a passenger being impaled on it in
a head-on collision. The court determined, on the strength of the Bulner and
Alexander decisions, that even if negligence had been found, North Carolina
courts would not have imposed liability under the crashworthiness theory.33
Larsen was adopted first in North Carolina by the United States District
Court for the Middle District in North Carolina in Isaacson v. Toyota Motor
Sales.34 InIsaacson a car that had stopped for a raised drawbridge was struck
in the rear. It burst into flames and killed the passengers. The complaint al-
leged that negligent design caused the gas tank to rupture, filling the passenger
compartment with gasoline fumes.35 The Isaacson court rejected the earlier
federal court decisions dealing with the crashworthiness doctrine, 36 and main-
tained that North Carolina, while not a products liability innovator, would be
responsive to the near unanimity in other jurisdictions and adopt Larsen.37
The Isaacson court believed that two arguments from Larsen would be
persuasive to North Carolina courts. First, it would be irrational to differenti-
ate, as the Evans court had, between defects that caused accidents, and defects
that merely enhanced the injuries received in accidents. As long as some other
event, no matter how trivial, actually began the causal chain, a court following
Evans would insulate manufacturers from liability, no matter how gross the
negligence or how catastrophic its consequences. It "would invite a harsh re-
sult to hold as a matter of law that a manufacturer is under no duty to manu-
facture an automobile which is reasonably safe in the event of an accident
when the technology to produce such an automobile may be available."38
Second, despite contentions that Larsen mandated a floating "Sherman
tank"39 design standard, under the crashworthiness theory the manufacturer
need eliminate only unreasonable dangers in accordance with general negli-
gence principles. These principles contemplate a balancing of the burden of
protection against the possible harm to be avoided.40
32. The court stated that:
The duty of reasonable care comprehends a duty to warn of danger and conse-
quently a manufacturer of product which to his actual or constructive knowledge in-
volves dangers to users has a duty to give warning of such dangers. Stegall v. Catawba
Oil Co., 260 N.C. 459, 133 S.E.2d 138 (1963). However, the manufacturer is not liable
for injury to the user by reason of a condition which is plainly observable. Douglas v. W.
C. Mallison & Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 138 (1965).
Id at 446-47.
33. Id at 447. The argument could be made that this is dictum. The finding that defendant
manufacturer was not negligent made consideration of the crashworthiness doctrine unnecessary.
34. 438 F. Supp. I (E.D.N.C. 1976). Isaacson was decided 14 months before Simpson.
35. Id at 4.
36. Id at 5-6. The court considered the Bulliner crashworthiness conclusion, see supra note
21, as dictum; it affirmed Alexander on the basis of the severity of the collision, considering treat-
ment of the crashworthiness issue unnecessary. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. Isaacson, 438 F. Supp. at 7.
38. Id at 8.
39. See Alexander, 346 F. Supp. at 327.
40. Isaacson, 438 F. Supp. at 8.
"The manufacturer does not have to make a product which is 'accident-proof' or 'fool-
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After ruling that the North Carolina courts would apply the crashworthi-
ness theory, the court examined defendant's contention that even conceding a
duty to make the vehicle reasonably crashworthy, no reasonable steps could
have been taken to make the vehicle safe in such a violent collision.4 1 The
court found insufficient evidence to rule as a matter of law on this contention,
and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. 42
The next case to examine crashworthiness in North Carolina was Sealey v.
Ford Motor Co. 43 In Sealey the passengers burned to death after a ruptured
gas tank leaked fumes into the passenger compartment. Plaintiffs contended
that negligent design of the fuel tank had allowed it to leak when the car rolled
over in an accident. The parties agreed that the facts presented a classic
crashworthiness situation.44 The court then considered the basic rationale for
the doctrine and determined that the reasoning in Evans was unrealistic.
45
The court cast its vote with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions and
adopted the Larsen doctrine.4
6
In 1981, despite recent cases such as Isaacson and Sealey and similar as-
sessments from courts in other circuits,4 7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held in Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. 48 that a district court
had not committed reversible error by ruling that "the North Carolina
Supreme Court would not hold a manufacturer liable for injuries arising from
defects which neither caused nor contributed to the accident. '49 The district
court had adopted the questionable, older precedents of Bulliner and Alexan-
der. The court of appeals' three paragraph per curiam opinion gave no spe-
cific reasons for its conclusion; a footnote, however, stated that the North
Carolina Supreme Court's recent rejection of strict liability in Smith v. Fiber
Control Corp. 50 "fortifies our belief that if called upon the Supreme Court of
North Carolina would also reject the second crash theory." 5 1 Given the
proof'. Liability is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is created. Whether or
not this has occurred should be determined by general negligence principles, which in-
volve 'a balancing of the likelihood of harm if it happens against the burden of precau-
tions which would be effective to avoid the harm.'"
Id (quoting Noel, Manufacturer'r Negligence ofDesign or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE
LJ. 816, 818 (1962) (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.4, at 1542 (1956))). This was the
first opinion of the North Carolina district courts to mention that Larsen does not require manu-
facturers to design a "Sherman tank" as was suggested in Alexander, 436 F. Supp. at 327. The
omission of this reasonableness element from the earlier district court opinions is an indication
that their analyses of Larsen were incomplete.
41. Isaacson, 438 F. Supp. at 9-10.
42. Id
43. 499 F. Supp. 475 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
44. Id at 477-78. The court, however, found no North Carolina precedent to apply to
crashworthiness, and also found a split of authority in the federal courts sitting in North Carolina.
45. Id at 479.
46. Id at 478-79.
47. Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031
(1981).
48. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981).
49. Id
50. 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980).
51. Wilson, 656 F.2d at 960 n.l.
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supreme court's reasons for declining to accept strict liability, this analogy be-
tween strict liability and crashworthiness is tenuous.52
Thus, the stage was set for Marlin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 5 3 The
federal district court had denied summary judgment in favor of defendant
auto manufacturer on a crashworthiness claim.5 4 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that reversal was
required by Wilson, since it is the practice of the court to consider panel deci-
sions as binding precedent until overruled en banc.55 Thus, the denial of a
rehearing en banc amounted to a decision to adopt Wilson as definitive. Judge
Murnaghan dissented from the denial to criticize Wilson's validity. This
prompted Chief Judge Phillips to concur specially in the per curiam opinion.56
Judge Murnaghan argued that Wilson's prediction that North Carolina
would follow Evans and reject Larsen was "simply wrong." 57 First, he stated
that the rule in Wilson was one of proximate cause:
The case holds that, however foreseeable in fact the likelihood of
injury might be, an automobile manufacturer, as a matter of law, is
free to ignore the inevitable consequences of its negligence when the
chain of events triggering a plaintiff's injury (including injury due to
the negligent construction of the vehicle) originates with the negli-
gence of a third party.58
North Carolina tort law, however, recognizes no such bright line test; the issue
of proximate cause in negligence actions goes to the jury in virtually all
cases. 59 Second, Judge Murnaghan cited with approval the 1981 United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case, Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A. G.,60
which affirmed a New Jersey district court's conclusion that North Carolina
would accept the crashworthiness theory. The Seese court believed that given
the "absence of any expression by North Carolina and a split of authority by
federal courts in that state, a prediction as to the law North Carolina would
adopt can only be based on the greater persuasiveness of one of the conflicting
theories, with an eye to the nationwide trend .... ,,61 Both the majority and
52. The Smith court did not address the merits of strict liability, but based its rejection of the
doctrine on its incompatibility with the requirement of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1979) that the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk be available in products liability ac-
tions. Smith, 300 N.C. at 678, 268 S.E.2d at 509-10. Crashworthiness, in contrast to strict liability,
is a negligence theory, Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503, and is compatible with those defenses, see Seese v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 842 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
53. 707 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1983).
54. Martin v. Smith, 534 F. Supp. 804 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
55. Martin, 707 F.2d at 827 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 825 (Phillips, C.J., concurring). Judge Phillips served on the panel that decided
Wilson, 656 F.2d 960.
57. Id at 827 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
58. Id
59. Id; See also Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 403, 250 S.E.2d 255,
258 (1979).
60. 648 F.2d 833 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
61. Id at 841. In Seese the court examined the federal precedents in North Carolina on the
crashworthiness issue and decided to follow the reasoning in Isaacson and Sealey as more persua-
sive and consistent with the law in other jurisdictions. Id at 830-40. The court further concluded
that: "'we take it as beyond peradventure that an automobile manufacturer today has some legal
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dissenting opinions in Seese conceded that North Carolina would accept
crashworthiness; the dissent differed principally on the refusal to remand for a
new trial on damages.6 2
Judge Murnaghan also argued that because it was unlikely that a state
court would have an opportunity to consider the issues, 63 it was the duty of the
circuit judges to rehear the case and not "shrug off an erroneous decision on
the grounds that, if incorrect, it will all in due course be set straight by a North
Carolina court."'64 The probable, and in his opinion distasteful, alternative to
overruling the case en banc would be the gradual application of various North
Carolina authorities to "construct narrow distinctions stringently circumscrib-
ing Wilson and in effect restricting it to the very facts of the particular case."'65
In fact, the order reversed in Martin had attempted something analogous, dis-
tinguishing Wilson on the ground that the pleadings in Martin had alleged that
defendant's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the fatal injuries,
instead of merely enhancing them. 66 In both cases, however, the ultimate
proximate cause of the accident was not the defect alleged by the plaintiff.
The trial court in Martin also had argued that Wilson was not "in har-
mony with accepted principles of North Carolina tort law."67 It cited five such
principles that conflicted with the Wilson rationale: (1) "proximate cause of an
injury is a factual question for the jury, rather than a question of law for the
court;" 68 (2) "[t]here may be more than one proximate cause of an injury; ' 69
(3) "[i]f the negligence of an actor is a proximate cause of any part of the
obligation to design and produce a reasonably crashworthy vehicle."' Id at 841 (quoting Hud-
dell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3rd Cir. 1976)).
62. See id at 849-850 (Adams, J., dissenting).
63. The absence of a significant producer of motor vehicles in the state suggests that
diversity jurisdiction will almost surely exist, or that the suit will be brought in some
other state, whose capacity to deal with North Carolina law should be no greater than
ours.... North Carolina has not adopted a referral statute permitting certification of a
controlling question of stale law to the North Carolina Supreme Court. . . .A case is
not likely to generate damage claims of$ 10,000 or less, and no car manufacturer is apt to
fail to remove when sued in a North Carolina court so long as Wilson and the panel
opinion in the instant case remain dispositive.
Martin, 707 F.2d at 828 n.1 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Judge Mumaghan's logic, however, may not be sound. A plaintiff wishing to go to state
court could defeat diversity by joining the manufacturer's local distributor; without complete di-
versity, removal to the federal courts is impossible. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806). Instead, the lack of North Carolina decisions on crashworthiness may be due to desire
by North Carolina plaintiffs' attorneys to take advantage of federal rules of discovery or jury
selection. It also could have resulted from a willingness to risk that the federal courts might apply
crashworthiness, rather than risk facing the traditionally conservative North Carolina courts.
With Martin and Wilson firmly rejecting crashworthiness, there no longer appears to be any rea-
son for plaintiffs' attorneys to sue in federal court.
64. Martin, 707 F.2d at 828 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
65. Id
66. See Martin, 534 F. Supp. 804, 806 (W.D.N.C. 1982). Plaintiff alleged that had the gas
tank not been negligently designed, the victims would have suffered only insignificant injuries;
instead they were burned to death.
67. Id
68. Id (citing Snell v. Cauble Sand & Rock Co., 267 N.C. 613, 618, 148 S.E.2d 608, 611
(1966)); Taney v. Brown, 262 N.C. 438, 444, 137 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1964); Short v. Chapman, 261
N.C. 674, 680, 136 S.E.2d 40, 45 (1964)).
69. Id (citing Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App. 509, 512, 255 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1979)).
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injuries, he is liable for that part;' 70 (4) "[d]efendants' negligence, in order to
be actionable, need not be the sole proximate cause of injury, nor the last act
of negligence;" 71 (5) "lilf the intervening act of a third person is reasonably
foreseeable, it does not insulate a previously negligent party from liability for
injuries caused by or contributed to by that previous negligence."'72
Chief Judge Phillips defended Wilson in his special concurrence. He
warned against use of the "gentle pressure tactics of 'assuming' that the state
courts will necessarily follow a view proclaimed by the federal court to be
'enlightened.' 73 He argued that looking at what state courts have recently
said as well as the "basic doctrinal premises they have seemed most consist-
ently to hold" 74 is a better means of forecasting state law than extrapolating
the trend of "enlightened" law in other jurisdictions. Thus, he believed that
the only valid criticism of Wilson would be one that challenged the rationality
of the assumptions Wilson made based on "indicators" in North Carolina
law."7 This view, however, puts the critic at a disadvantage since the Wilson
court did not reveal its assumptions, and the district court decision it summa-
rily affirmed was not published. The only discernible "indicator" in Wilson
was the reference to North Carolina's rejection of strict liability in Smith .76
Now, of course, there is Chief Judge Phillips' special concurrence.
Chief Judge Phillips cited in his Martin concurrence three "indicators"
supporting the assumption in Wilson that North Carolina would reject
crashworthiness. "First and foremost is the fact that North Carolina has at
this late date not yet joined the crashworthiness 'trend.' "77 The lack of an
appropriate case to consider the doctrine was dismissed as a minor obstacle, as
"[icourts minded to join 'enlightened trends' in decisional law have no diffi-
culty reaching out in 'near' cases to join up."7 8
This argument is not persuasive. A court unsure about the wisdom of an
innovative rule of law may avoid reaching it until the experience of other ju-
risdictions has cast some light upon the subject, embracing the rule only when
careful examination of other precedent indicates it to be just and prudent. This
is exactly what North Carolina did in abandoning the requirement of privity
70. Id (citing Wise v. Vincent, 265 N.C. 647, 652, 144 S.E.2d 877, 881 (1965)).
71. Id at 807 (citing Batts v. Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963); Richardson v.
Grayson, 252 N.C. 476, 113 S.E.2d 922 (1960)). See also Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App, 509, 512,
255 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1979).
72. Martin, 534 F.Supp. at 807 (citing Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 276 N.C. 398, 404,
172 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1970)).
73. Martin, 707 F.2d at 825 (Phillips, CJ., concurring specially).
74. Id
75. Id
76. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially).
78. Id
To dismiss this with the suggestion that it has not been possible to join because an appro-
priate case has not yet been presented and to forecast that-because of diversity's ref-
uge-it will not likely be presented in the future denigrates the wit both of the North
Carolina courts and of counsel practicing in those courts.
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in products liability negligence claims.79 Furthermore, the converse of Chief
Judge Phillips' argument is that a court set on rejecting a doctrine will do so,
even though only in dictum.80 Thus, if North Carolina actually preferred Ev-
ans, there should be state court decisions "joining-up" with that unen-
lightened trend.
Chief Judge Phillips advanced Miller v. Miller8 1 as an example of a case
in which the "join-up" easily could have been accomplished.8 2 In Miller the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the failure to
wear a seat belt, absent special circumstances, was not contributory negli-
gence. Using Miller to demonstrate North Carolina's unwillingness to accept
crashworthiness in 1983 is inappropriate for several reasons. First, Miller was
decided only nine days after Larsen, which makes it highly unlikely that the
crashworthiness rationale was considered. Second, Miller was not a products
liability case; it dealt with contributory negligence in an action against the
driver of an automobile for personal injuries suffered by a passenger.83 Third,
to "reach out" and impose a duty on manufacturers to use reasonable care not
to expose consumers to an unreasonable risk of injury in a collision, the Miller
court would have had to impose an analogous duty on the public to fasten
their seat belts whenever riding in an automobile. This would have denied
plaintiff recovery by imposing a standard of care almost universally disre-
garded, a result the court was anxious to avoid.84 This failure of the "reason-
able man" to recognize the duty to wear seat belts was the true basis of the
court's refusal to impose such a duty. That the omission actually did not cause
the collision was icing on the cake.85
Chief Judge Phillips' second "indicator" was North Carolina's reluctance
to adopt such liberal tort theories as strict liability and comparative negli-
gence.86 This analogy is questionable, however, because the crashworthiness
theory does not dispense with negligence, as does strict liability, nor does it
seek to apportion fault between the defendant and the plaintiff. Instead,
crashworthiness merely sharpens the focus on proximate cause, recognizing
two distinct proximate causes instead of one, and imposes the familiar liability
of a joint tort-feasor. Thus, the measure of recovery is not changed; it is only
spread more equitably among the blameworthy.
The last "indicator" suggested by Chief Judge Phillips consisted of "the
guidance to be had from recent doctrinal expressions by North Carolina's
highest court."'87 Judge Phillips conceded that crashworthiness is in large part
a question of proximate cause, and that North Carolina generally considers
79. See Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 490-97, 157 S.E.2d 98, 102-06 (1967).
80. See Bulliner, 54 F.R.D. at 482. See also supra note 26.
81. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
82. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially).
83. Miller, 273 N.C. at 229-30, 160 S.E.2d at 67.
84. See id at 237-38, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
85. Id at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
86. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially).
87. Id
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proximate cause a question for the jury. He contended, however, that concep-
tually "there is strong indication that the North Carolina Supreme Court pres-
ently identifies the 'first impact' as the critical and sole one for proximate
causation-hence tort liability-analysis."8 8 Such an analysis would preclude
the crashworthiness defect as a valid proximate cause of injuries. 89 Judge
Phillips stated that the Miller court had relied on this analysis when it deter-
mined that the failure to fasten seat belts was not contributory negligence per
se.
90
The difficulty of apportioning damages also was advanced by Chief Judge
Phillips as an alternate ground for the Miller decision. 91 This characterization
minimizes the importance of the Miller court's devoting the first seven pages of
its opinion to resolving whether "the occupant of an automobile [has] a duty to
use an available seat belt whenever [the car] is operated on a public high-
way."' 92 It was only after answering that question in the negative that the
Miller court added: "It would be a harsh and unsound rule which would deny
all recovery to the plaintiff, whose mere failure to buckle his seat belt in no
way contributed to the accident, and exonerate the active tort-feasor but for
whose negligence the plaintiff's omission would have been harmless. '93 The
Miller court gave several other minor justifications, then discussed at length
the difficulties of apportioning damages between a negligent defendant and
contributorily negligent plaintiff, which it deemed a problem that "cannot be
dismissed lightly."94 The court, however, did not base its decision on that
ground. Rather, the court espoused it as one of a number of factors reinforc-
ing the dispositive holding that the customary conduct of the reasonably pru-
dent man does not include wearing his seat belt.95
Although Chief Judge Phillips' reasoning was faulty in applying his three
"indicators," he was correct when he said that the first step in predicting the
future of the law in a jurisdiction is to look to the present status of the general
state law. Thus, if the crashworthiness theory is compatible with North Caro-
lina products liability tort law, federal courts are justified in predicting that
North Carolina would accept the crashworthiness doctrine.
In North Carolina a products liability claim sounding in tort must include
the same elements as any negligence claim: (1) evidence of a standard of care
owed by the reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances; (2) breach of
that standard of care; (3) injury caused directly or proximately by the breach;
and (4) loss because of the injury.96 Thus, for the crashworthiness theory to be




92. Miller, 273 N.C. at 230, 160 S.E.2d at 68.
93. Id at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
94. Id at 238-40, 160 S.E.2d at 73-74.
95. Id at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
96. City of Thomasville v. Lease-Afex, Inc., 300 N.C. 651, 656, 268 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1980)
(citing W. PROSSER, HoRNBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971)).
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compatible with North Carolina law, each of these essential elements must be
established.
The manufacturer's standard of care under the crashworthiness theory is
compatible with the duty of care under North Carolina products liability law.
In the leading case of Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp. 97 the North Carolina
Supreme Court quoted this definition with approval:
Since the liability is to be based on negligence, the defendant is
required to exercise the care of a reasonable man under the circum-
stances. His negligence may be found over an area quite as broad as
his whole activity in preparing and selling the product. He may be
negligent first of all in designing it, so that it becomes unsafe for the
intended use. He may be negligent in failing to inspect or test his
materials, or the work itself, to discover possible defects, or danger-
ous propensities. 98
The duty to eliminate any unreasonable risk to the passengers in the event of
collision is not dissimilar to this duty to inspect and test the work and materi-
als to discover possible defects or dangerous propensities.
Even if there is no duty in North Carolina to eliminate unreasonable risks
of injury to passengers in the event of a collision, there is such a duty under
federal law. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act99 was passed
in 1966, shortly after the decision in Evans, and declared the necessity of es-
tablishing motor vehicle safety standards. 1° ° "Motor vehicle safety" was de-
fined as:
the performance of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment in
such a manner that the public is protected against unreasonable risk
of accidents occurring as a result of the design, construction or per-
formance of motor vehicles and is also protected against unreasonable
risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents do occur, and
includes nonoperational safety of such vehicles. 101
The intent of the Act was to authorize the creation of standards that would
impose a duty of care on the auto industry identical to that required under the
crashworthiness theory. The standards are binding on the states10 2 and spec-
ify the testing and degree of protection required of the automobile manufac-
turer. These standards began coming out in 1971 and regulated, among other
things, occupant impact with the interior of the passenger compartment, 10 3
protection of the driver from injury caused by the steering column,1° 4 reten-
97. 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
98. Id at 491, 157 S.E.2d at 102-03 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 665 (3rd ed.
1964)).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
100. Standards promulgated under this legislation are located in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.201-571.302 (1983).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982).
103. Eg., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.201 (occupancy protection
in interior impacts), § 571.208 (occupant crash protection) (1983).
104. Id § 571.203 (protection for driver from impact with steering mechanism), § 571.204
(steering control rearward displacement).
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tion of passengers within the vehicle in a collision,105 and seatbelts and child
restraints.106 North Carolina indicated its support of this effort by enacting
the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact.10 7 Somewhat surprisingly, the man-
ufacturers themselves acknowledge this responsibility to protect the passenger
in their advertising, touting efforts to eliminate risks to the passenger upon
impact. 108
Thus, there is ample evidence that it is reasonable to require automobile
manufacturers to eliminate unreasonable risks of injury in the event of a colli-
sion, and that the duty is not incompatible with the North Carolina products
liability standard of due care.
The second essential element in a products liability tort action is a breach
of the duty owed. This could be found in any failure of the manufacturer to
eliminate unreasonable risk of injury. 0 9
The third essential element is that the injury be caused directly or proxi-
mately by the breach. Thus, the crashworthiness defect must be established as
a proximate cause of the injuries sustained. Logically, it is not accurate to say
that one event can be the sole proximate cause for all the injuries suffered in a
crashworthiness situation. It is accurate, however, to say that the initial im-
pact is the sole proximate cause of the injuries which would have been suffered
in the crash absent the crashworthiness defect. The initial impact is also a
proximate cause of the enhancement of injury suffered as a result of the
crashworthiness defect, since there would be no injuries at all without that
initial impact. By the same token, however, the crashworthiness defect is also
a proximate cause of the enhancement of injuries, for without the defect the
enhancement of injuries would not have occurred. The cause of the collision
and the crashworthiness defect would be concurrent proximate causes, and the
manufacturer and the person responsible for the collision would be joint tort-
feasors with regard to the enhancement of injuries. It cannot, however, accu-
rately be said that the initial impact is the sole proximate cause of the en-
hancement of injuries, because it alone could not have caused the
enhancement.
To deny that the crashworthiness defect is a proximate cause of enhance-
ment of injuries imposes complete liability on the person responsible for the
initial collision, regardless of how harmless it would have been in the absence
of the manufacturer's negligence. When the other driver is without insurance
or appreciable assets, denial of the manufacturer's liability for its negligence
105. Id § 571.206 (door locks and door retention systems), § 571.210 (seat belt assembly
anchorages).
106. Id § 571.207 (seating systems), § 571.209 (seat belt assemblies), § 571.213 (child restraint
systems).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183.13 (1983).
108. General Motors has been running television advertisements in North Carolina touting
their continuing efforts to improve the crashworthiness of their automobiles (over 150 new
automobiles demolished in crash tests).
109. In Larsen the breach was the improper design of the steering column, a solid column
which projected beyond the wheel base in such a way as to present an obvious danger of rearward
displacement towards the driver in an accident.
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would leave the plaintiff without compensation for his injuries, even those at-
tributable to the crashworthiness defect. Chief Judge Phillips stated that this
harsh result was required by the "in no way contributed to the accident"110
language in Miller. This interpretation of Miller, however, is refuted by that
court's subsequent language:
Furthermore, it is safe to assume that, if an unbelted plaintiff sus-
tained an injury in an automobile accident, he would also have suf-
fered some injury-albeit minor-from buffeting even had he been
wearing his seat belt. Therefore, since plaintiff could have suffered
some injury as a result of the occurrence which resulted solely from
the defendant [driver]'s negligence, defendant's plea of contributory
negligence would not be good as to those injuries.'
Therefore the North Carolina Supreme Court, rather than using "purely con-
ceptual [analysis]. . . identiflying] the 'first impact' as the critical and sole one
for proximate causation,"' " 2 has given a strong indication that it would use a
concurrent proximate cause analysis similar to that advanced above.
This indication was reinforced in the 1980 North Carolina Supreme
Court case of City of Thomasville v. Lease-Afex, Inc.,113 a products liability
case actually considering the enhancement of damages allegedly caused by
negligent design. Defendant installed a fire suppression system on a bulldozer
used by plaintiff at a sanitary landfill. The bulldozer caught fire and was
badly damaged when the fire suppressant system failed to operate. The court
reversed summary judgment for defendant on the negligent design and war-
ranty claims, holding that if the system had failed to function properly, it must
have "caused at least some of the damage to plaintiff's bulldozer." 114 Thus,
recognition of the crashworthiness defect as a proximate cause of the enhance-
ment of damages is consistent with North Carolina products liability law.
The last element in a negligence cause of action is that there be loss be-
cause of the injury. The question is not so much whether there was damage as
how to determine what part of the damage is attributable to each cause. It
would be difficult in many cases to differentiate between damage solely due to
the original impact and damage due to enhancement of injuries caused by the
crashworthiness defect. In Miller the court addressed the problem, and noted
that the difficult task of apportioning damages already was performed by
North Carolina courts in applying the doctrine of "avoidable conse-
quences."" t 5 This doctrine imposes the duty on a plaintiff to minimize the
injuries caused by another; the plaintiffs failure to do so will defeat his recov-
110. Martin, 707 F.2d at 826 (Phillips, C.J., concurring specially). See Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
237, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968).
111. Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
112. Martin, 707 F.2d at 827.
113. 300 N.C. 651, 268 S.E.2d 190 (1980).
114. Id at 657, 268 S.E.2d at 195. This case is not a complete parallel to the crashworthiness
situation as there is no dispute that the "standard of care of a reasonably prudent fire suppression
system manufacturer is to manufacture a system which functions properly." Id at 656, 268 S.E.2d
at 194.
115. Miller, 273 N.C. at 239-40, 160 S.E.2d at 74.
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ery to the extent of the resulting aggravation of injuries.' 16 This aggravation
of damages often cannot be calculated with certainty, and in a close case a
court may rightly refuse to allocate damages between the plaintiff and defend-
ant.117 When the allocation is between two defendants, however, there is no
reason not to hold them jointly and severally liable casting the burden on each
to prove what part of the damages is not allocable to his negligence. This
treatment of damages is consistent with the concern for the plight of the wor-
thy plaintiff voiced in Miller.'18 Similarly, the Court in Lease-Afex, Inc. dis-
played no reluctance to allow damages when it would be hard to apportion
them between the causes of the injuries. 119 Thus, damages in a crashworthi-
ness cause of action are acceptably ascertainable under North Carolina law.
It appears that because of the compatibility of the crashworthiness doc-
trine with North Carolina products liability law, North Carolina would accept
the crashworthiness theory. Moreover, it is unlikely that North Carolina
courts will have the opportunity to rule on the issue. Thus, it is critical that the
divided federal courts in North Carolina have a clear and well-reasoned pre-
cedent to follow. Martin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. is particularly disap-
pointing in this respect. Thorough analysis of relevant North Carolina law
reveals that the arguments advanced by those courts predicting the rejection of




117. Id at 240, 160 S.E.2d at 74.
118. Id at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 273.
119. Lease-Alfex, Inc., 300 N.C. at 657, 268 S.E.2d at 195.
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